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Public Sector Deficits and Private Investment: 
A Test of the Crowding-out Hypothesis in 
Pakistan's Manufacturing Industry 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
The purpose of the analysis below is to assess whether this public sector crowding 
out of investment in manufacturing has been a major factor affecting the pattern of 
private capital formation in that sector. The results of modified Granger Causality test 
suggest that expanded public investment in infrastructure has not played an important 
role in stimulating private investment in industry. If anything, it appears that private 
investment has stimulated a follow-on expansion in infrastructure. Instead of crowding 
in (i.e., a positive feedback effect) additional private investment, infrastructure invest-
ment appears to have led to larger deficits and domestic borrowing. In turn, these finan-
cial developments have dampened the flows of private capital into the important 
large-scale manufacturing sector. 
On the other hand, financial crowding-out of private investment in large-scale 
manufacturing is a distinct possibility; but it may not be a simple, straight-forward 
process. The results obtained also suggest that private investment in large-scale manu-
facturing has suffered from real crowding-out associated with the government's non-
infrastructural investment programme. Finally, it should be noted that neither financial 
nor real crowding-out seems to occur in other areas of private investment. Clearly, 
further research should be undertaken to determine why the large-scale manufacturing 
sector is unique in this regard. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect of Pakistan's post-1988 stabilisation programmes has 
been the attention given to supply-side policies. The privatisation programme and 
the additional steps taken to liberalise domestic economical activities are key 
elements in the authorities' strategy to enhance the supply side of the economy. 
Expanded privatisation is accompanied by the opening of new activities (such as 
utilities assurance) to the private sector, further simplification of the investment 
regime, and removal of the remaining price distortions. 
In addition, the authorities hoped that private investors would respond along 
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the lines originally suggested by Hirschman ( 1958), talcing advantage of the cost-
reducing effects of infrastructure. Through this mechanism, public investment was 
to assume a leading role in financing expanded capital formation in productive 
investment, specially manufacturing. 
However, the patterns of public and private investment have been rather para-
doxical. That is, contrary to the development model led by 'unbalanced infrastruc-
ture' [Looney and Frederiksen (1981)) as postulated by Hirschman, several recent 
studies have found that public investment has played a rather passive role in stimu-
lating follow-on private investment [Looney (l 992, l 992a, 1994 ); Looney and 
Winterford (1992)). Specifically, public facilities appear to have largely expanded in 
response to the needs created by expanded private investment in manufacturing, 
rather than strongly initiating the capital formation process. 
Clearly, if the economy is to sustain high rates of overall growth in the 
future, the government must find ways of encouraging the private sector to play a 
more active role. Does this mean a shift away from infrastructure and towards other 
programmes which are more effective in encouraging private investment? Has the 
failure of infrastructure-led growth been due to a general unwillingness of the 
private sector to invest (despite the incentives created by infrastructure)? Or, has the 
expanded infrastructure investment created an offsetting set of factors associated 
with 'crowding out' or preemption of investment funds (or driving up borrowing 
rates), thus discouraging private investment? 
The purpose of the analysis below is to assess whether this public sector 
crowding-out of investment in manufacturing has been a major factor affecting the 
pattern of private capital formation in that sector. Has crowding-out occurred? If so, 
was the crowding-out financial or real? Was crowding-out associated with public 
sector fiscal deficits or with the manner in which these deficits were financed? Based 
on the answers to these questions, several implications are drawn for the purposes of 
a macro-economic policy. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The issue of crowding-out has been discussed at length in the literature. As 
Blejer and Khan ( 1985) note, one could argue with some justification that crowding-
out may be a relatively common phenomenon in the developing world. While casu-
al observation of the experiences of most developing countries would support this 
view, the mechanism or mechanisms through which such crowding-out occurs, if it 
does, are still being debated and there is no unanimity of views [Gupta (1992)). 
Previous Studies 
If budgetary deficits cause a displacement of private investment, a link should 
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exist between budget deficits and interest rates, with rising interest rates leading to 
the crowding-out of private investment expenditures. As Burney and Yasmeen 
( 1989) note, the empirical evidence on this point has been inconclusive. For exam-
ple, they cite Cebula (1988); Deleuw and Holloway (1985); Hoelscher (1986) and 
Khan (1986) as having found evidence linking deficits to higher interest rates. On 
the other hand, Dewald ( 1983); Dwyer (1982); Evans (1987); Hoelscher (1983); 
Makin (1983); Mascaro and Meltzer (1983); McMillan (1986); Motley (1983) and 
Plosser (l 982) found that deficits do not have a significant impact on interest rates. 
It should be noted, however, that all these studies focus almost exclusively on 
conditions in the developed countries. 
Yet, several studies have attempted to identify the existence of crowding-out 
in the Pakistani context. In a recent study, Ahmad (1994) tests for this phenomenon 
over the 1970-1991 period. He also examines the hypothesis that the real interest 
rates are adversely influenced by the expected rate of inflation. Pakistan has experi-
enced a host of structural changes during this period, especially in the financial 
sector. For example, a partial interest-free banking system was introduced in 1981. 
Pakistan also announced a policy of delinking the Pakistan rupee from the U.S. 
dollar and dropped a floating exchange rate system in 1981. This led to a sharp 
depreciation of the Pakistani currency and subsequently increased workers' remit-
tances at an unprecedented rate. 
After testing an IS-LM model, with interest rates related to real government 
spending, real government budget deficits, real money stock, and the expected rate 
of inflation, he finds that none of the explanatory variables exert a significant influ-
ence on the nominal rate of interest. The real rate of interest is adversely affected by 
the expected rate of inflation. From this he concludes that there is no support to the 
crowding-out hypothesis. This suggests that monetary and fiscal policies have no 
impact on interest rates and, therefore, stabilisation policies can be used in Pakistan 
(within reasonable limits) without worrying about their adverse effect on economic 
growth. 
In contrast, Burney and Yasmeen's (1989) study focuses on possible 
budgetary links with interest rates. Their findings (p. 976) suggest that the overall 
government budget deficit in Pakistan does not have any significant impact on the 
nominal interest rates. However, when assumed that people can predict the future 
rate of inflation accurately, the overall deficit is found to have a significant impact 
on the nominal interest rate. Although they do not directly examine the impact on 
private investment, it is noted that there may be an inverse relationship between 
investment and nominal interest rates. If this ls the case, their results suggest that an 
increase in the overall deficit is likely to crowd out private investment expenditure 
in Pakistan. 
However, in the case of Pakistan, there is ample reason to believe that the 
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usual crowding mechanisms involving rising interest rates (stemming from 
increased public domestic borrowing) are a minor factor in suppressing private 
investment as compared to credit rationing [Kemal (1991)] in an environment of 
financial repression. Khan (l 988), for instance, has convincingly identified the pres-
ence of financial repression in the country's capital markets. 
Similarly, Khan, Hasan and Malik (1992) find that the real interest rate exert-
ed a positive and significant effect on the national savings rate. A one-percent 
increase in the real interest rate is likely to increase the savings rate by 0.07 percent. 
They conclude that this positive and significant effect of the real interest rate on the 
savings rate confirms the existence of financial repression in Pakistan. 
Because the interest rate mechanism does not play nearly as active an alloca-
tive role in Pakistan and many other developing countries, the mechanisms responsi-
ble for possible crowding-out are not as well-established. Still, one could argue with 
some justification that, in view of the significant share of the public sector in total 
capital formation, the degree and magnitude of the administrative controls over the 
financial system, and the limited access to international capital markets by private 
borrowers, the government would still exercise a relatively strong influence over 
private investment. 
The absence of a flexible interest rate mechanism means that the reduced 
form-type equations are more applicable for estimating possible crowding-out. Here 
crowding out can be broadly defined to include both financial and real crowding-out 
[Blejer and Khan (1985)]. 
Financial Crowding-out 
Financial crowding-out stemming from fiscal deficits can be examined within 
the framework of one of three macroeconomic theories: (a) conventional crowding-
out, (b) Keynesian crowding-out, as FitzGerald (1979, 1980, 1987) calls it, and (c) 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments [Khan and Iqbal (1991)]. Let us 
have a description of these first. 
1. Co11ve11tional Crowding-out occurs when the deficit is financed by selling 
bonds. The price of bonds is bid down (due to oversupply) which is 
equivalent to an increase in interest rates. The higher interest rates cause 
investment to decline or to be "crowded out" as a result of the higher 
deficit. Neither the savings nor the external balance is affected, since 
these depend on income and relative price levels, respectively. 
2. The Monetary Approach examines the case where the deficit is mone-
tised, creating an excess supply of money. Since interest rates are (for 
most smaller countries) determined internationally, savings and invest-
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ment are unchanged. Thus, there is either a capital outflow or an increase 
in imports-the full effect of the deficit is felt by the worsening of the 
external balance (B). 
3. Keynesian Crowding-out assumes that any increase in the deficit is paid 
for through the increases in private savings. This is the same as a 
decrease in or the "crowding-out" of private consumption. 
While seemingly straight-forward, when applied to developing countries, 
these theories have led to conflicting findings [Looney and Frederiksen (1987)]. For 
example, FitzGerald (1979, 1980) found that public deficits displaced or crowded 
out private consumption in Mexico. In this context, private savings increased to 
finance the deficit. Furthermore, the increase in savings came at the expense of 
private consumption rather than private investment. This finding suggests that under 
certain circumstances the fiscal deficit may actually mobilise savings for increased 
levels of investment, and thus growth. However, in their examination of Mexico, 
Looney and Frederiksen found a more Keynesian result: increases in the deficit were 
accompanied by increases in consumption. In addition, private investment was 
affected adversely by inflation (in tum probably stemming from government 
deficits). 
Several studies have examined these issues in Pakistan. Bilquees (1989), for 
example, examines the relevance of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments and suggested that the theory's strong assumptions concerning homogene-
ity and openness make its relevance questionable for Pakistan. Consistent with this, 
her empirical study finds that the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
fails to explain the flows of foreign reserves in Pakistan (and_ India), where monetary 
policy is restrictive and the foreign exchange and capital markets are controlled 
[Bilquees (1989), p. 202]. 
On the other hand, Khan and Iqbal (1991) find no evidence of either conven-
tional or Keynesian crowding-out effects. Instead, they find that deterioration of the 
fiscal deficit has been worsening the current account balance, a finding that is in line 
with the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
In addition, their findings suggest that increases in the fiscal deficit have 
reduced private savings and, therefore, the investment and growth in Pakistan. 
Besides the existence of financial repression (low or negative real interest rates) and 
the lack of financial development (few financial institutions and the availability of 
few financial instruments), the fiscal deficit appears to be an important factor in 
accounting for such low savings. In short, their findings suggest that government 
savings are a substitute for private savings. 
Khan and Iqbal's findings also imply a positive association between the price 
levels and private consumption, hence confirming the dominance of income effects. 
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Since the increase in price level increases private consumption, it must reduce 
private savings and private investment. 
In other studies, Haque and Montiel (1991, 1993) note that the macroeco-
nomic consequences of fiscal deficits in Pakistan have apparently been quite differ-
ent from those in other developing countries experiencing deficits of a comparable 
magnitude. Specifically, Pakistan has experienced neither hyper-inflation nor debt-
rescheduling. As measured by the official figures, growth has remained quite strong 
through the last two decades, inflation has not been high and the current account 
deficit has averaged to about 21/2 percent of the GNP, largely remaining capable of 
being financed and not posing debt-servicing problems for the country. They argue 
that, to some extent, growth has itself accounted for this, as the associated expan-
sion of the base for both conventional taxes and seigniorage has made it possible to 
finance "equilibrium" deficits that are significantly larger than would have been 
possible to finance in a slow-growth economy. 
They warn, nevertheless, that since the early Eighties fiscal deficits have been 
financed by recourse to domestic non-bank borrowing, resulting in the increasing 
ratios of domestic public debt to the GNP and to the rising interest rates on such 
debt. Their model simulations suggest that while relying on this source of finance 
may have mitigated the inflationary consequences of the deficits, this has been done 
at the expense of some crowding-out of private investment and has, thus, implied a 
slower growth than would otherwise have .been observed. Controlling the deficit 
over this period would have contributed to more favourable macroeconomic 
outcomes-at least with respect to growth and the external accounts-but not if the 
deficit reduction had been brought about in the manner commonly relied upon both 
in Pakistan and elsewhere-i.e., by reducing public investment. 
Real Crowding-out 
In addition to the financial factors noted above, private investment may have 
experienced real crowding-out. This occurs if government expenditures preempt 
scarce physical resources that would otherwise be available to the private sector. 
As with financial crowding-out, however, the results of studies testing for real 
crowding-out have been mixed [Galbis ( 1979); Sundararajan and Thakur (1980); 
Wai and Wong (1982) and Looney (l992b)]. No doubt a complicating factor here 
stems from the fact that government expenditures can cause real "crowding-in" as 
well as real "crowding-out". As Noman (1991) dbserves, recent research such as 
that by Taylor ( 1988) has emphasised that private investment and public expendi-
tures can be not only substitutes but also complements. Thus, certain public invest-
ments, e.g., on infrastructure, can "crowd in" a la Hirschman rather than crowd out 
private investment. He warns, however, that "ultimately [though] unsustainably 
large fiscal deficits, even if they are not crowding out the private sector for extended 
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periods, force adjustment and if that is excessively delayed lead to a macroeconom-
ic crisis" (p. 783). 
Clearly, a case can be made that some form of crowding-out of private 
investment has occurred in Pakistan. The real issue seems to come down to the 
manner in which the crowding-out has taken place. To pin down these mechanisms, 
additional analysis needs to be undertaken: 
1. In the studies noted above, the direction of causation has implicitly been 
assumed to go from government deficits to expanded domestic borrowing 
to interest rate increases and/or credit rationing and, ultimately, reduced 
private investment. One could just as easily argue that increased levels of 
private investment have placed pressure on the government to expand 
facilities, especially in energy. The government, wishing to aid private 
investment while simultaneously lacking adequate funding for major 
infrastructural programmes, may first grant the private sector various 
forms of relief such as tax holidays followed by modest increases in 
public investment. The outcome of this process would be expanded 
deficits, but not necessarily the crowding-out of private investment in the 
classical sense. The causation issue must be addressed before any defini-
tive conclusion concerning crowding-out can be reached. 
2. As a related issue, the timing of these impacts needs to be identified. 
Many effects associated with government deficits are likely to have a 
delayed impact on private investment decisions. Again, because the 
timing of these effects has not be~n spelled out, the patterns of causation 
are unclear. Gupta ( 1992) does make an attempt to identify the relevant 
lag structure, but these are arrived at in a somewhat arbitrary manner. 
3. If we assume that interest rate effects are only one factor associated with 
the government deficit as it pertains to private investment, the theory of 
crowding-out becomes unclear as to the relevant form of the budgetary 
deficit. If the interest rate mechanism is not perfect, are private investors 
more concerned or affected (through perhaps credit rationing) by the 
actual deficit, some sort of expected deficit, unanticipated changes in the 
deficit, or even deviations in the deficit from some longer-run budgetary 
trend? 
4. The environment in which deficits exist needs to be identified. 
Obviously, if deficits stem largely from increased government consump-
tion or defense, their negative impact on private investment will be the 
greater than if they had stemmed simply from increased infrastructural 
investment. 
5. The financing of the public sector deficit and government capital forma-
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tion needs to be examined in detail. Have the deficits been associated 
with government investment or consumption? How have the deficits been 
financed as between domestic and foreign borrowing? Do the impacts of 
domestic versus foreign borrowing vary with regard to their effect on 
private industrial investors? 
6. One reason for these inconclusive results is due to the failure to separate 
out the real from financial crowding-out. In this regard, Blejer and Khan 
( 1984, 1985) have argued that public investment involves both the devel-
opment of infrastructure, which would likely be complementary with 
private investment, and other types of non-infrastructural investment that 
competes with private investment either through absorbing limited physi-
cal resources or thorough the production of marketable output. Taken 
together, these effects of the infrastructural and non-infrastructural 
components can offset each other, thereby yielding the impression that 
the impact of total government investment on the level of private invest-
ment is weak or insignificant. Their work has shown that once the two 
aspects of public investment are recognised, and a distinction made along 
functional lines involving infrastructural and non-infrastructural invest-
ment, much stronger statements can be made on the role of governmental 
investment in private capital formation. 
The Issue of Causation 
As noted, a major issue in the analysis of the role of government deficits in 
Pakistan's post-1971 development centres around the direction of causation: do 
deficits affect private sector investment in manufacturing as suggested by the crowd-
ing-out school or do deficits simply respond to the needs created by an expanding 
economy? 
It follows that before drawing any definitive conclusions as to the impact of 
the public sector deficit, one must satisfactorily address the issue of causation. 
Fortunately, several statistical tests using regression analysis for this purpose are 
gaining wider acceptance. The original and most widely used causality test was 
developed by Granger ( 1969). According to this test, deficits (DEF) affect (say) the 
growth of private sector investment in manufacturing (PIM) if this series can be 
predicted more accurately by past values• of deficits than by past (investment) 
growth patterns. To be certain that causality runs from deficits to PIM, past values 
of the public deficit must also be more accurate than past values of private invest-
ment at predicting increases in the deficit. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag 
length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of rele-
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vant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, the 
inclusion of irrelevant lags causes the estimates to be inefficient. While it is possible 
to choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial auto-correlation methods, there is 
no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all types of deficits. 
The Hsaio Procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio (1981) developed a system-
atic method for assigning lags. This method combines the Granger Causality and 
Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean square prediction error, 
to find the optimum lag for each variable. In a paper examining the problems 
encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten (1985) found Hsaio's 
method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other 
systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors [Looney (1994)], four 
cases are possible. (a) Fiscal Policies (Deficits, Borrowing, Expenditures) cause 
Private Investment when the prediction error for private investment decreases as the 
fiscal action is included in the growth equation. In addition, when private investment 
is added to the fiscal equation, the final prediction error should increase. (b) Private 
Investment causes a Fiscal Response when the prediction error for private invest-
ment increases as fiscal actions are added to the regression equation for private 
investment, and is reduced when private investment is added to the fiscal regression 
equation. (c) Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases as a fiscal 
policy is added to the private investmen,t equation, and the final prediction error 
decreases when private investment is added to the fiscal equation. And (d) No 
Relationship exists when the final prediction error increases both as fiscal policies 
are added to the private investment equation and as private investment is added to 
the fiscal equation. 
Operational Procedures 
The data used to carry out the causation tests was derived from the World 
Bank (1984, 1991, 1992, 1993) data figures: the Gross Domestic Product and the 
GDP price deftator is from the IMF publication, International Financial Statistics. 
All variables are in logarithmic1 form, were deflated by the GDP deflator, and are in 
constant 1985 prices. 
To determine the robustness of our findings (and whether the results were 
1Before running the regressions, unit root tests were carried out to check for stationarity-cf 
Doornik and Hendry (1994), The results of these tests indicated that the variables included in the equa-
tions were stationary, A similar finding has been reported in Sakr (1993), 
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sensitive to the definition of key variables), various measures of the deficit were 
examined. These included the actual (or realised) deficit, the expected deficit (the 
predicted value obtained by regressing each year's deficit on its value for the previ-
ous year), and the unexpected deficit (the difference between each year's actual 
deficit and that anticipated based on past patterns). A priori we might expect that 
unanticipated increases in the fiscal deficits or in domestic borrowing would have a 
stronger effect on private investment. Presumably, unanticipated increases in these 
variables signify more of an emergency borrowing situation, thus making it more 
difficult for the private sector to realise its borrowing needs. 
Relationships were considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 
ninety-five percent level of confidence. That is, if ninety-five percent of the time we 
could conclude that they had not occurred purely by chance, we considered them 
statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that fiscal deficits 
and private investment in manufa.:turing have a set lag relationship-that is, they 
influence one another over a fixed period. To find the optimal adjustment period of 
impact, lag structures of upto six years were estimated.2 The lag structure with the 
highest level of statistical significance was the one chosen as depicting best the rela-
tionship under consideration (the optimal lag reported in Tables I through 3). 
Besides the financial variables (fiscal deficits, public sector borrowing) tradi-
tionally used in crowding-out analysis, several types of government expenditure 
were also examined. Infrastructure investment was defined as general government 
investment (consisting of federal, provincial, and local investment). Non-infrastruc-
tural public investment consists largely of investment in public enterprises and was 
defined as total public investment minus general (infrastructural) investment. 
Ceteris paribus, infrastructure investment should have a positive ("crowd in") 
effect on private investment since it is most likely to reduce the costs of private 
sector manufacturing and thus to stimulate capital formation in that sector. On the 
other hand, non-infrastructural investment is assumed, ceteris paribus, to result in 
"real" crowding out of private investment. 
As a basis of comparison, government consumption (and in several cases 
defense expenditure) was also included in the analysis. Since this type of expendi-
ture is not likely to compete with the private sector for resources, real crowding out 
was assumed not to be a factor affecting pfr~ate investment. On the other hand, the 
manner in which government consumption was financed might cause either financial 
crowding out or a Keynesian demand-induced expansion in private investment. 
2 A set of detailed statistical results are available from the author upon request. These include the 
final prediction effort, Durban-Watson statistic, and the adjusted? statistic. 
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Table l 
Pakistan: Causal Patterns: 
Private Investment in Large-scale Manufacturing 
Direction of Optimal Relative 
Relationship Causation La~ (Years) Strength 
Private Investment/Financial Policies 
(l) Realised Fiscal Deficit Feedback 1,-2,+ w,w 
(2) Realised Public Domestic Borrowing Feedback 1,-2,+ m,w 
(3) Realised Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
(4) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit Feedback 4,-1,+ m,m 
(5) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing Feedback 1,-1,+ m,w 
(6) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
Private Investment/Expenditure Policies 
(7) Realised Public Infrastructure Invest. Private--+ Public 1 + s 
(8) Realised Public Non-infst. Investment Private--+Public 4+ w 
(9) Realised Public Consumption Public--+ Private 4+ s 
(10) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. Private--+Public 2+ w 
(11) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. Feedback 4,-2,+ S,W 
(12) Unexpected Public Consumption Public--+ Private 3+ s 
Unexpected Private Investment/Fiscal Policies 
(13) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit No Relationship 
(14) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing Public--+ Private 1(-) w 
(15) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
(16) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. Private--+ Public 4+ m 
(17) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. Feedback 4,-1,- S,W 
(18) Unexpected Public Consumption No Relationship 
Note.c See text for a description of the estimation methods. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest 
final prediction error. All variables are estifllRted in logarithmic form. The signs (+,-) represent 
the direction of the impact. In the case of feedback, the first term is the impact of fiscal policy on 
private investment; the second is the impact of private investment on fiscal policy. Strength 
assessment, (w) week, (m) moderate, and (s) strong, is made on the basis of the improvement in ? 
and the size of the standardised regression coefficient. 
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Table 2 
Pakistan: Causal Patterns: 
Private Investment in Small-scale Manufacturing 
Relationship 
Direction of Optimal 
Private Investment/Financial Policies 
(!) Realised Fiscal Deficit 
(2) Realised Public Domestic Borrowing 
(3) Realised Public Foreign Borrowing 
(4) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit 
(5) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing 
(6) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing 
Private Investment/Expenditure Policies 
(7) Realised Public Infrastructure Invest. 
(8) Realised Public Non-infst. Investment 
(9) Realised Public Consumption 
(10) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. 
(11) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. 
(12) Unexpected Public Consumption 
Unexpected Private Investment/Fiscal Policies 
(13) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit 
(14) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing 
(15) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing 
(16) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. 
(17) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. 
( 18) Unexpected Public Consumption 















































Notes: See text for a description of the estimation methods. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest 
final prediction error. All variables are estimated in logarithmic form. The signs (+,-) represent 
the direction of impact. In the case of feedback, the first term is the impact of fiscal policy on 
private investment; the second is the impact of private investment on fiscal policy. Strength 
assessment. (w) week, (m) moderate, and (s) strong, is made on the basis of the improvement in r2 
and the size of the standardised regression coefficient. 
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Table 3 
Pakistan: Causal Patterns: 
Private Non-manu[pcturin& Investment 
Relationship Direction of Optimal Relative Causation Lag (Years) Stren~h 
Private Investment/Financial Policies 
(I) Realised Fiscal Deficit Feedback 3,+l,+ m,w 
(2) Realised Public Domestic Borrowing Feedback 2,+l,+ W,W 
(3) Realised Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
(4) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit Feedback 2,+1,+ s,m 
(5) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing Feedback 2,+l,+ m,w 
(6) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
Private Investment/Expenditure Policies 
(7) Realised Public Infrastructure Invest. Feedback 4,+4,+ w,m 
(8) Realised Public Non-infst. Investment Feedback 1,+2,+ w,w 
(9) Realised Public Consumption Feedback 1,+2,+ W,W 
(I 0) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. Private-+Public I + w 
(11) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. , Private-+ Private 2+ w 
(12) Unexpected Public Consumption No Relationship 
Unexpected Private Investment/Fiscal Policies 
(13) Unexpected Fiscal Deficit Public-+ Private 2+ w 
(14) Unexpected Domestic Borrowing No Relationship 
( 15) Unexpected Public Foreign Borrowing No Relationship 
(16) Unexpected Infrastructure Invest. No Relationship 
(17) Unexpected Non-infrastructural Invest. Feedback l,+1,- w,m 
(18) Unexpected Public Consumption No Relationship 
Notes: See text for a description of the estimation methods. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest 
final prediction error, All variables are estimated iQ logarithmic form. The signs (+,-) represent 
the direction of impact. In the case of feedback, the first term is the impact of fiscal policy on 
private investment; the second is the impact of private investment on fiscal policy. Strength 
assessment, (w) week, (m) moderate, and (s) strong, is made on the basis of the improvement in r2 
and the size of the standardised regression coefficient. 
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To sum up, the expected impact of the governmental financial and expendi-
ture policies on private investment in manufacturing is as follows: 
Fiscal Policy Expected Impact Mechanism 
Financial 
Fiscal Deficits financial crowding out 
Domestic Borrowing financial crowding out 
Foreign Borrowing increased foreign exchange 
Expenditure 
Infrastructure + real crowding in 
Non-infrastructure real crowding out 
Consumption ? net outcome real/financial 
Using this framework: 
l. We examined both the financial and real impacts of fiscal policy on 
private investment in manufacturing. 
2. Because we would expect large manufacturing units to be more depen-
dent on outside financing, separate tests were carried out for large and 
small firms. 
3. As a basis of comparison, similar tests were performed on: (1) total 
private non-manufacturing investment, (2) private investment in housing, 
and (3) private investment in transport/communications. 
4. To assess whether specific public expenditures were financed in a partic-
ular way (e.g., general deficit or intemaVextemal borrowing), we exam-
ined the links between the government's expenditures and its fiscal 
accounts. 
III. RESULTS 
This analysis produced a number of interesting findings (Tables 1-3). First, 
here are the findings regarding the impact and interaction of the government's 
financiaVexpenditure policies on private investment in large-scale manufacturing 
• (Table 1): 
I. Consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, the overall impact 
(Equation I) of the actual (realised) deficit on private investment in 
manufacturing was negative. This effect, however, was rather weak and 
on average occurred with a lag of one year. In tum, increases in private 
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investment produced a weak response expansion in the deficit. On aver-
age, this effect occurred over a two-year period. 
2. Reinforcing the crowding-out hypothesis, the results obtained using 
public borrowing in the domestic capital markets (Equation 2) also 
produced feedback patterns showing the impact of borrowing on private 
investment as negative. This negative effect on private investment was 
stronger than that produced by the fiscal deficits. 
3. Also consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis was the pattern associ-
ated with public borrowing in foreign markets (Equation 3). Borrowing 
in these markets had no impact on private investment, that is, govern-
ment borrowing in foreign markets did not come at the expense of 
private investment in large-scale manufacturing. 
4. As expected, unanticipated fiscal deficits and public borrowing in the 
domestic capital markets was more detrimental (Equations 4 and 5) to 
private investment than the effects produced by the actual/realised 
deficits and borrowings. Again, the relationship between fiscal policy and 
private investment was a feedback pattern, with increased private invest-
ment stimulating further fiscal deficits and public borrowing in the 
domestic capital markets. 
5. As with realised foreign borrowing, unanticipated borrowing in external 
markets had no statistically significant impact on private investment in 
large-scale manufacturing. 
The pattern of government expenditure-; and private investment expenditures 
on private investment in large-scale manufacturing also produced several interesting 
insights. 
1. Both the infrastructural and non-infrastructural components of public 
investment responded (Table I, Equations 7 and 8) to the needs produced 
by expanded private investment, that is, private investment in large-scale 
manufacturing induced a follow-on increase in government investment. 
Infrastructure was the more responsive component of government invest-
ment, with private investment inducing a strong and rapid (optimal lag of 
one year) governmental response. 
2. Increased government consumption provides (Equations 9 and 12) a fair-
ly strong stimulus to private investment in large-scale manufacturing. 
Because of its strength in both the realised and the unanticipated forms, 
consumption probably stimulates ppvate investment through a Keynesian 
demand linkage mechanism. 
3. The link between private investment in large-scale manufacturing and 
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unexpected public investment varied by type of investment. Unexpected 
infrastructure investment (Equation 10) appears to be a response to the 
needs of the private sector. No doubt, this expansion in infrastructural 
facilities tends to be the largest during periods of acceleration in private 
investment. 
4. On the other hand, non-infrastructural investment appears to crowd out a 
certain amount of private investment in large-scale manufacturing 
(Equation 11 ). Also, a feedback mechanism occurs here, whereby 
increases in private investment also encourage a further expansion of 
non-infrastructural investment. 
As noted above, tests were also undertaken for unanticipated private invest-
ment in large-scale manufacturing. Our logic here was that this measure of private 
investment might be more sensitive to sudden shifts in financial conditions than the 
level of private investment. This assumption, however, was not completely borne 
out by the tests: 
I. No statistically significant patterns exist between unexpected private 
investment (Equation 13) in large-scale manufacturing and unanticipated 
fiscal deficits. 
2. Unexpected increases in domestic borrowing (Equation 14) did, however, 
crowd out a certain amount of private investment, although this effect 
was rather weak. 
3. On the other hand, the patterns between unexpected government invest-
ment in infrastructure and private investment were quite strong, with 
private investment again inducing a follow-on amount of infrastructure 
expansion. 
4. Links with non-infrastructural investment were of a feedback-type 
increase in non-infrastructural investment strongly suppressing private 
investment. In turn, unexpected expansions in private investment lowered 
the future increases in non-infrastructural investment. This final effect, 
however, was relatively weak. 
5. Apparently, the demand increases associated with unexpected increases 
in public consumption (Equation 18) are not considered significant 
enough to warrant a response by private large-scale manufacturing 
investors. 
For the purposes of this study, the patterns associated with private investment 
in small-scale manufacturing (Table 2) were in sharp contrast to those found to 
characterise large-scale manufacturing. Again, looking mostly for evidence of the 
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crowding out of private investment, the following observations are to be made. 
l. In contrast to the negative impact on private investment in large-scale 
manufacturing produced by fiscal deficits, private investment in small-
scale industries increased with the size of the deficit (Table 2, Equation 
2). This pattern also characterised unexpected domestic borrowing 
(Equation 5). 
2. In addition, the fiscal deficit appears to have almost no impact on invest-
ment in small-scale manufacturing. Instead, increases in this type of 
investment encourage follow-on public expenditures (Equations 7 and 8) 
which, in tum, cause the government to accelerate expenditures relative 
to revenues (Equations I and 4 ). 
3. A final contrast occurs with respect to unexpected public consumption. 
Instead of stimulating further private investment, this form of public 
expenditure suppresses (Equation 12) further private investment. 
4. Finally, the results using unexpected private investment in small-scale 
manufacturing produced little in the way of firm evidence for crowding-
out, either of the financial or real type. In fact, unanticipated increases in 
domestic borrowing were associated with further increases in private 
investment (Equation 14 ). 
Private investment in non-manufacturing activities produced another distinc-
tive pattern (Table 3): 
I. Overall evidence exists of crowding-out, financial or real. The dominant 
pattern is one of feedbacks both between public sector financial and 
expenditure activities and private investment (Equations 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 
8). 
2. Overall, the impacts of these feedbacks are the strongest in the direction 
of public to private. The one exception here is the relatively strong 
impact of increased private investment on government infrastructural 
investment (Equation 7). 
3. The only negative impact is between unexpected increases in private 
investment and unexpected increases in non-infrastructural investment. 
However, from these results alone it is impossible to identify the source 
of this pattern, i.e., whether, for example, the private sector was able to 
crowd out the public sector by outbidding it for resources. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICA.TIONS 
These findings suggest that crowding-out may be largely confined to one 
294 Robert E. Looney 
(albeit a very important) area of investment, private investment in large-scale manu-
facturing. Here crowding-out appears to be largely related to increased fiscal deficits 
and associated domestic borrowing. However, unanticipated increases in public 
investment in non-infrastructural activities may cause some real crowding-out. 
As is often found in the industrial countries, recent research on public expen-
ditures in developing countries suggests that the potentially beneficial effects of 
public investment are often offset by adverse developments in financial markets-the 
so-called crowding-out effect. Similarly, increased public sector investment may 
preempt resources that might otherwise be available at reasonable prices for private 
investment-Le., real crowding-out. Our main assumption in designing this study was 
that for the financial crowding-out hypothesis to be valid for Pakistan, a pattern 
should occur whereby increased public expenditures expand the size of the fiscal 
deficit. In turn, the enlarged deficit is financed through additional domestic borrow-
ing rather than alternative sources of funding (taxes, foreign borrowing). Here the 
assumption was that real crowding-out might be inferred if two conditions were 
present: (a) causation was from public investment to private investment and its 
impact was negative, and (b) causation was not from increased public investment to 
increased government borrowing in the domestic markets. 
The causality tests suggest that expanded public investment in infrastructure 
has not played an important role in stimulating private investment in industry. If 
anything, the results suggest that it is private investment that has stimulated a 
follow-on expansion in infrastructure. Instead of crowding in (i. e., a positive feed-
back effect) additional private investment, however, infrastructure investment 
appears to have led to larger dificits, and domestic borrowing. In tum, these finan-
cial developments have slowed down the flows of private capital into the important 
large-scale manufacturing sector. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To sum up, financial crowding-out of private investment in large-scale manu-
facturing is a distinct possibility, but it may not be a simple, straightforward 
process. The results obtained above also suggest that private investment in large-
scale manufacturing has suffered from real crowding-out associated with the 
government's non-infrastructural investment programme. Finally, it should be noted 
that neither financial nor real crowding-out ~ems to occur in other areas of private 
investment. Clearly, further research should be undertaken to determine why the 
large-scale manufacturing sector is unique in this regard. 
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